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RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF GRATUITOUS
AUTOMOBILE PASSENGERS
WniLAM W. HAMILTON 1

W

ITH the advent of the automobile came also an
enlargement of a doctrine which had previously received little attention in the deliberations of our courts
of last resort. Often the law has been criticized for a
failure to keep pace with the many changes in the world's
economic and social structure. Certainly such criticism
is not appropriate when applied to the rights and liabilities of gratuitous automobile passengers. One need only
refer to opinions being rendered each day by the highest
tribunals of both state and nation to be convinced of this.
The foundation of the doctrine was laid before the
advent of the automobile but. only to a minor degree.
The reason is obvious-the danger was not so great in
vehicles prior to automobiles and even for some time
after the advent of automobiles the doctrine was not
enlarged to a very great extent. An early opinion by the
Court of Appeals of Georgia clearly corroborates this
fact, where it remarks:
It is insisted in the argument that automobiles are to be
classed with ferocious animals, and that the law relating to the

duty of the owners of such animals is to be applied.

It is not

the ferocity of the automobile that is to be feared, but the
1Member of the Illinois Bar; associated with the Chicago Board'of
Underwriters.
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ferocity of those who drive them. Until human agency interferes, they are usually harmless. While by reason of the-rate
of pay allotted to the judges of this state, few, if any, have
ever owned one of these machines, yet some of them have occasionally ridden in them, thereby acquiring some knowledge of
them; and we have, therefore, found out that there are times
when these machines not*onlyTick ferocity, but assume such an
indisposition to go that it taxes the limit of human ingenuity
to make them move at all. They are not-to be-classed- with bad
2
dogs, vicious bulls, evil-disposed mules, and the like.
Therefore, in an.automobile we have -an instrumentality
which, when operated by a reckless or incompetent person, becomes inherently dangerous. . The power, control,
and speed of automobiles are new factors which tempt
a reckless driver,'to undertake hazardous risks. On" the
other hahd :they:.aff6rd elements of: safety and convenience to a. careful one. The law contributes to the
rational enjoyment of the automobile, to the safety. of
its occupants, and to the welfare bf the traveling public,
when it holds the driver to a positive duty and the occupants to a standard of ordinary care. In commenting
upon the changing conditions, the Federal Court said:
An automobile driver has the opportunity,, if the situation
is one of uncertainty to settle that uncertainty on the side of
safety, with less inconvenience, no danger, and more surely than
the driver of a horse. Such being the case, the'law, both from
the standpoint of his own safety and the menace his machine
is to the safety of others, should, in meeting these new conditions, rigidly hold the automobile driver to such reasonable care
and caution as go to his own safety and that of the traveling
public. If the law demands such care, and those crossing railroads, etc., take such care and not chance their protection, the
3
possibilities of automobile accidents will be minimized.
Notwithstanding the automobile has, in- some jurisdictions, won judicial encomium and is shielded as being a
Lewis v. Amorous, 3 Ga. App. 50.
3 New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Maidment, 168 Fed. 21.
2
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harmless instrumentality, the fact remains that its toll
of life and limb far exceeds that of any other human
agency. An automobile moving at an ordinary rate of
speed requires the constant attention of the driver, and
oftentimes that of the occupants, if it is not to become
a menace to the safety of its occupants, as well as pedestrians. The locomotive engineer and passengers may
contemplate the landscape with comparative assurance
that the train will not run into a ditch, but the driver of
an automobile may take but momentary glances at his
surroundings if he would keep his car upon the highway
and preserve the security of its occupants. The dangers
incident to the inattention of 'the driver of an automobile
are very great. Inattention to driving for a fraction of
a second may plunge the car into a ditch and bring death
or serious injuries to its occupants. Where such grave
hazards exist, the standard of care measuring the liability of the driver and the occupants should not be
treated too'lightly.
If we consider the appalling, number of automobile
fatalities and accidents since the. prevalence of automobiles on our thoroughfares and highways with their
attending tragedies, the subject is of human interest;
and if we consider the element of driving, from the back
seat-thebane of all persons at the steering wheel-as a
factor, the subject certainly becomes of interest when
modelling our dispositions; but if -we analyze the many
legal consequences giving rise to different doctrines
enunciated by the courts, the subject approaches profound importance, both to the .lawyer and the layman.
The tragedies arising from the facts of each case and
the legal significance of the doctrines enunciated therein
are so interwoven that we may treat them together We
shall dismiss the factor of driving from the back seat
with the candid admission that although it is irritating,
disturbing, and annoying, it is-in a majority of casesconducive to the better welfare and safety of all the
parties concerned. Interference by the passenger or
guest where the vehicle is about to be placed in a position
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of danger may, at times, prove to be gross imprudence
and so disconcert the driver as to cause the disastrous
result which such interference was designed to avoid.
Many are the problems which arise from the facts in
decided cases. In some instances the court will apparently fail to take .into consideration any of these many
problems which the ordinary layman deems of paramount importance, but upon a close observation they will
be found to possess no real legal significance.
Whether a passenger exercises the care required of
him depends on the facts of the particular case and particularly his position in the automobile, his opportunity
of seeing the impending accident, and the obviousness
of the. danger. Besides these elements, does the fact
that the occupant is riding with one whom he knows to
have undergone several minor accidents, but who in his
experience has always been a careful driver and observant of the rights of others, preclude him from a recovery? Or, suppose a guest is riding with one who has
be'en in several' actionable accidents, but on every ride
has shown himself to be a careful driver, is the guest
guilty of contributory negligence with knowledge of these
facts when injury results? Should the guest's own ability or knowledge as a driver, the question of whether he
rides often as a guest, or his aptitude at judging distances and speed while ii a moving vehicle, enter as a
factor? Should the occupant's mental or physical condition be considered in determining his actions as those
of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances ?
Some courts have confronted and answered these questions logically, simply, and directly. Others have answered them in an indirect, bewildering, and confusing
manner.
Fearing that some of the state tribunals have not
remedied many evils existing in actions by guests against
their host, legislatures in some jurisdictions have passed
statutes on this subject. The states which have such
statutes are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Oregon, South Caro-
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lina, and Vermont. While the enactment of these "guest
laws," as they are commonly known, will not bar the
institution of inherently honest suits, they will act to
deter the filing of meritless claims. Moreover, cases
involving members and relatives of families, where the
driver is insured, present a golden opportunity for collusion so difficult to prove. Courts generally recognize
such obvious defects, as was so well stated in the case
of Truso v. Ehnert:4
Counsel for defendant may be right in his attitude that the
numerous cases now arising wherein a guest in an automobile,
frequently closely related to the driver sues him for damages
because of his alleged negligence but more because of his insurance, call for some new law. It may be that as a practical matter the most important fact in the case is that the defendant
is insured. But the need for new law is a matter for the legislatures. The courts can only apply existing law adapting it
to new situations as they arise. So we cannot absolve the driver
of an automobile from the old duty of due care for the protection of those who entrust their safety to his management of
his automobile. The mere circumstance of family ties or the
relation of guest and host do not put a case beyond
the operation of that duty.
Enunciations of this character have undoubtedly
prompted the aforementioned states to enact legislation
in partial attempt to remedy this defect.
California now has a statute, 5 effective August 14,
1929, which provides that any person who as a guest
accepts a ride in a vehicle on the public highways of the
state of California, or the estate, legal representatives,
or parents of such guest shall have no cause of action
against the driver or owner of the vehicle except when
injury or death proximately results from the intoxication, wilful misconduct, or gross negligence of the owner.
Prior to the enactment of this statute, California followed the majority rule of ordinary care.8
4 177 Minn. 249.

5 Statutes of 1929, p. 1580.
6 Perry v. McLaughlin, (Cal.) 297 Pac. 554.

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

A statute was enacted in Connecticut 7 which provides
in effect that a guest shall have no cause of action for
damages against the owner or operator for injury, death,
or loss in case of accident "unless such accident shall
have been intentional on the part of said owner or
operator or caused by his heedlessness, or his reckless
disregard of the rights of others." The statute has been
construed as constitutional by the Supreme Court of
Connecticut,8 as well as by the Supreme Court of the
United States. 9
Delaware passed a similar statute 10 on April 1, 1929;
Indiana, a statute made effective May 21, 1929; and in
1927, Iowa enacted a statute" effective March 31, 1930.
Michigan also has a statute,'1 2 passed in 1929, which reads
as follows: "That no person transported by the owner
of a motor vehicle as his guest, without payment for
such transportation, shall have a cause of action for
damages against such owner or operator for injury, death
or loss in case of accident unless such accident shall have
been caused by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton
misconduct of the owner or operator of such motor vehicle, and unless such gross negligence or wilful misconduct contributed to the injury, death, or loss for which
the action is brought."
In 1927 a statute was passed in Oregon denying a
guest any recovery against the driver or owner for injuries received while riding in an automobile on the
public highways of the state of Oregon. This statute
was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of
Oregon.' 3 That court, on a motion for rehearing, differentiated the statute of Oregon from that of Connecticut
as passed on in the case of Silver v. Silver,14 on the
7 Public Acts of 1927, Ch. 308.

s Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371.
9 Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117.
1o 36 Del. Laws, Ch. 270, p. 795.

11 Code of Iowa, 1927, sec. 5026-b-1.
12 Public Acts of 1929, No. 19.
v. Houk, 127 Or. 589.
'5stewart
14 108 Conn. 371.
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ground that the Connecticut act endeavored to readjust
the duty, whereas the Oregon act abolished the remedy.
Pursuant to this, the Oregon legislature passed an act
which is similar to that of Connecticut and reads:
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor
vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation
shall -have a cause of action for damages against certain owner
or operator for injury, death. or loss, in case 6f accident,, unless
such accident shall have been caused by the intentional act of
said owner or operator, or caused by his gross negligence or
intoxication, or his recklessness as iegards the rights of others.' 5
A statute . was enacted and made effectgve on March 7,
1930, in Sofith Carolina, which provides a similar restric16
tion on such caues of action., The statute in Vermont
makes like provision
After defeating a measure similar to the foregoing
measures on March 31, 1931, the Illinois legislature, on
July 2, 1931, approved the following act:
No person riding in a motor vehicle as a guest, without payment for such ride, nor his personal representative in the event
of. the death of such guest, shall have a cause of action for damages against the driver or operator of such motor vehicle or its
owner or his employee or agent for injury, death or loss, in case
of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the
wilful and wanton misconduct of the driver or operator of such
motor vehicle or its owner or his employee or agent and unless
such wilful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury,
death or loss for which the action is brought."
Although it has no statute on the subject, Massachusetts is the leading jurisdiction on the minority rule that
the owner of an automobile is liable to his guest for gross
negligence only. 8 However, this rules does not apply
15 Laws of 1929, p. 550.
16 Act of 1929, No. 78.
17 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. 1931, Ch. 95a, par. 43.
1s Bank v. Satran, 266 Mass. 253; Kirby v. Keating, (Mass.) 171 N.
E. 671; Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487.
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in case of death, as the "death statute" allows the deceased's representative to recover where only "ordinary
negligence" is shown. Georgia follows the minority ruling in requiring negligence of the owner or operator to
be shown as gross negligence. 19 Washington also follows
the minority view. 20 In Nebraska, under a statute, 21 the
the doctrine of comparative negligence is applied, and the
negligence of the guest should, therefore, be a matter
to be considered only by way of mitigation of damages.
English courts seem to hold in accordance with the
majority of jurisdictions in this country. Baron Parke
in Lygo v. Newbold, 22 held that one who undertakes to
provide for the conveyance of another, even though he
does so gratuitously is bound to exercise due and reasonable care. The same result was reached in the case of
Harris v. Perry & Co.23
The Canadian courts have
24
adopted the same view.
While statutes are the only solution for the problem,
there is a question of whether the statutes that have been
passed provide an adequate remedy. The jury must still
decide what constitutes recklessness or conduct indicating a wanton disregard of the rights of the guest,
measuring such conduct by the test of what approximates
ordinary care. Although the term ",ordinary care" is
very wide in its application and at times may become
confusing to the juries, yet in jurisdictions where the
degrees of negligence are recognized, is it not logical to
assume that the jury will finally apply the standard of
ordinary care, and perhaps term the lack of it "gross
negligence" under the circumstances, thus producing the
same result but possibly in a different manner?
These guest cases have again led the courts to consider
whether there are various degrees of negligence. It has
19Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399.
20 Eastman v. Silva, (Wash.) 287 Pac. 656.
21 Compiled Statutes 1922, sec. 8832.
22 9 Exch. 302.
23 L. R. [1903] 2 K. B. 219.
.24 Parlov v. Lozina, 47 Ont. L. Rep. 376; Driscoll v. Colletti, 58 Ont.
L. Rep. 444; Ormand v. Carr, [1926] 3 D. L. R. 592.
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always been the writer's steadfast opinion that there are
no degrees of negligence and that the standard of care
always remains the same, but that a greater effort in
various circumstances must be exerted to attain that
25
standard of care. Lord Cranworth in Wilson v. Brett,
declares: "There is no difference between negligence
and gross negligence; it is the same thing with the addition of a vituperative epithet." The United States Supreme Court in Steamboat New World v. King,26 has
characterized as impracticable any degrees of negligence; and Judge Townes in his work on Torts says,
"It seems preferable to me to say that the standard of
care does not change."
Perhaps it would be wise to establish definitely as a
basis for our subsequent discussion the well-settled rules
as regards some of the doctrines which are an inherent
factor in the study of this subject.
Contributory negligence is such negligence on the
plaintiff's part as helped to produce the injury complained of, or, in other words, it is his failure to exercise
that ordinary care and diligence which would be expected
of a reasonably prudent person under like circumstances
to avoid injury to himself. Contributory negligence,
being a defense to be pleaded and proved, is generally
a question of fact, but when the established facts and
circumstances permit only one possible conclusion to be
drawn by a reasonably prudent man, it becomes a matter of law for the court's determination.
Anticipation of negligence in another is not a duty
which the law imposes. Neither can one be held guilty
of contributory negligence solely because he did not
anticipate a neglect of duty which others owed him. A
person in great peril, where immediate action is necessary to avoid it, is not required to exercise all the presence of mind and carefulness which are justly required
of a careful and prudent person under ordinary circumstances. His failure to employ the best course or action
25 11 Mees. & W. 113.
26 16 How. 469.
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to avoid the impending peril is not contributory negligence as a matter of law, although as a matter of subsequent mathematical calculation it can be shown that
the other alternative would have taken him out of danger. Thus, while one placed suddenly in peril will not
be required to exercise the same amount of care as is
required of a person who has ample opportunity for full
exercise of his judgment and reasoning faculties, the
same degree of care, that is, "reasonable care," is
required.
Error of judgment is not necessarily negligence. The
correct test is: Did the party act as a reasonably prudent
person would have acted under similar circumstances?
The care required has been declared to be as follows:
That degree of care which people of ordinary prudent habitspeople in general-could be reasonably expected to exercise
under the circumstances of a given case . . . that degree of
care and prudence and good sense which men who possess those
qualities in an average or ordinary degree exercise under similar
circumstances. 27
No certain and unbending rule as to what constitutes
negligence can be established for all possible contingencies and what may be prudent under some circumstances and at some times may be negligent under other
circumstances and at other times. The standard, which
is an elastic one, is that of a prudent man-what such
a man would do and would foresee under such circumstances as those under consideration.
It may be stated, then, that the ingredients of contributory negligence do not differ in any respect from
those of primary negligence. They are, after all, like
those of primary negligence-relative and not absoluteand, being relative, are dependent on the peculiar circumstances of each particular case. The Oregon Supreme
Court very lucidly says:
Negligence may be grounded in action or refusal to act, in
speaking or failing to speak, all with reference to duty in the
27 Hoff v. Los Angeles-Pacific Co., 158 Cal. 596.
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We can easily conceive of cases where a clamor of

direction by the guests would confuse a driver or chauffeur and
increase the danger in a manner amounting to contributory
negligence of the passenger. In others, the duty to utter warning might be imperative. In some instances it would be rank
folly to wrest the reins or the wheel from the one in charge of
the vehicle. In others, it might be highly necessary to do that
very thing. The court cannot lay down a mathematical precept
as a rule of law enjoining in detail what should be said or done
or omitted in every juncture of danger. It is plain, however,
that an invited guest is not to be supine and inert as mere
freight. Accepting the hospitality of his friend does not excuse
him from the duty of acting for his own safety as a reasonably
prudent person would under like circumstances and conditions.
Whether he does so or not must be decided by the twelve who
declare the facts embodied in the verdict. 28
The case of Thorogood v. Bryan,29 decided in 1849, is a
well known English case which gave rise to the doctrine
of imputed negligence. There a passenger in a public
vehicle was held chargeable with any negligence of its
managers which contributed to his injury, notwithstanding the fact that he had no control over the driver. This
rule was the law in England for many years, but it has
now been overruled30 and is not recognized in this
country.
It is noticeable, however, that in jurisdictions which
have decided guest cases apparently on this doctrine,
where the finding of facts are against the plaintiff, the
holding is in reality not based upon any theory of the
imputation of negligence. The omission or negligent act
is that of the plaintiff under the circumstances and is
not imputed from the acts or omissions of another. The
view established by the overwhelming weight of authority
in this country is that the negligence of the'driver of a
motor vehicle is not imputed to a passenger who has no
28 White v. Portland Gas & Coke Co., 84 Or. 643.
29 8 C. B. 115.
80 The Bernina, L. R. [1886-1887] Prob. Div. 58.
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control over his operation of the machine. 3 1 Michigan is
the only state in which the negligence of the driver32of a
vehicle is imputed to the passenger riding therein.
It is, of course, elementary law that the driver of an
automobile is not an insurer and that in order for the
plaintiff to recover for injuries sustained, he must show
negligence by the driver in and about the handling of the
automobile which was a proximate cause of the injuries.
If the injury is occasioned through the concurrent negligence of the driver and a third person, they may be liable
as joint tort-feasors. 3 It was stated in the case of
Ballinger v. Thomas
One who is riding in an automobile, the driver of which is

not his agent or servant, and not under his control and who is
31 Bradley v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 288 Fed. 484; Crescent Motor Co.
v. Stone, 211 Ala. 516; Itzkowitz v. P. H. Reubel & Co., 158 Ark. 454;
Gilmore v. Caswell, 65 Cal. App. 299; Kelley v. Hodge Transportation
System, 197 Cal. 598; Campion v. Eakle, 79 Colo. 320; Clarke v. Connecticut Co., 83 Conn. 219; Poynter v. Townsend, 33 Del. 51; Holloway
v. City of Milledgeville, 35 Ga. App. 87; Swanlund v. Rockford Ry. Co.,
305 111. 339; Grifenhan v. Chicago Rys. Co., 299 Ill. 590; Wolf v. Vehling,
79 Ind. App. 221; Wagner v. Kloster, 188 Iowa 174; McRae v. Missouri
Pac. R. Co., 116 Kan. 99; Herndon v. Kentucky Traction & Terminal
Co., 214 Ky. 36; Daull v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 147 La. 1012;
Ham v. Maine Central R. Co., 121 Me. 171; Chiswell v. Nichols, 137
Md. 291; Shultz v. Old Colony St. Ry., 193 Mass. 309; Dumas v. Ward,
251 Mass. 497; Lundh v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 165 Minn. 141; Yazoo
& M. V. R. Co. v. Lucken, 137 Miss. 572; Boland v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co., (Mo.) 284 S. W. 141; Sherris v. Northern Pac. Ry.
Co., 55 Mont. 189; Kepler v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry. Co., 111 Neb.
273; Nicora v. Cerveri, 49 Nev. 261; Williams v. Boston & Maine R.
Co., 82 N. H. 253; Schroeder v. Public Service Ry. Co., (N. J.) 118 AtI.
337; Terwilliger v. Long Island R. Co., 136 N. Y. Supp. 733, affirmed in
209 N. Y. 522; Earnwood v. Southern Ry. Co., 192 N. C. 27; Amenia &
Sharon Land Co. v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 48 N. D.
1306; Toledo Rys. & Light Co. v. Mayers, 93 Ohio St. 304; Hasty v.
Pittsburg County Ry. Co., 112 Okla. 144; Robinson v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nay. Co., 90 Or. 490; Smith v. Reading Transit & Light Co.,
282 Pa. 511; Gansert v. Duhamel, 45 R. I. 477; Latimer v. Anderson
County, 95 S. C. 187; Eads v. Tiede, 45 S. D. 190; Schwartz v. Johnson,
152 Tenn. 586; City of Uvalde v. Stovall, (Texas Civ. App.) 279 S. W.
889; Cowan v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co., 56 Utah 94; Ronan v. J. G. Turnbull Co., 99 Vt. 280; Williams v. Lynchburg Traction & Light Co., 142
Va. 425; Neagle v. City of Tacoma, 127 Wash. 528; Jameson v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 97 W. Va. 119; Chase v. American Cartage Co.,
176 Wis. 235.
32 Lett v. Summerfield & Hecht, 239 Mich. 699.
83 195 N. C. 517.
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injured by the joint or combined negligence of a third person
and the driver, may recover of either or both, upon proper allegations, for the injuries thus inflicted through such concurring
negligence, is fully established by our own decisions and the
great weight of authority elsewhere.
What then is the duty which the driver owes to the
passenger? It must be borne in mind that there is a
clear distinction between the driver's liability to another
motorist and his liability to the guest. What might constitute negligence on the part of the driver as between
him and another motorist with whom he collides does not
necessarily constitute negligence between the driver and
one occupying his car as guest. The two situations are
entirely different as far as legal responsibility is concerned, and not depending altogether upon the same facts
or the same rules of law. The rule as to the duty of
the driver to passenger has been stated by the Indiana
Appellate Court as follows:
It seems to us that the only sensible and humane rule is that
an owner and driver of an automobile owes a guest at sufferance
the duty of using reasonable care so as not to injure him. The
rule as to trespassers and licensees upon real estate with all
its niceties and distinctions, is not to be applied to one riding
in an automobile at the invitation of or with the knowledge and
tacit consent of the owner and operator of the automobile. A
trespasser and licensee going upon a tract of land, an inert,
immovable body, takes it as he finds it, with knowledge that the
owner cannot and will not by any act of his start it in motion
and hurl it through space in a manner that may mean death
to him who enters thereon. He who enters an automobile to
take a ride with the owner also takes the automobile and driver
as he finds them. But when the owner of the automobile starts
it in motion, he, as it were, takes the life of his guest into his
keeping, and in the operation of such car he must use reasonable care not to injure anyone riding therein with his knowledge and consent. It will not do to say that the operator of an
automobile owes no more duty to a person riding with him as a
guest at sufferance, or as a self-invited guest, than a gratuitous
bailee owes to a block of wood. The law exacts of one who puts
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a force in motion that he shall control it with skill and care
in proportion to the danger created. This rule applies to a
34
guest at sufferance as well as to a guest by invitation.

This opinion was quoted and adopted in the Arkansas
35
case of Black v. Goldweber.
As a practical proposition, those who ride as guests
are not required to use many precautions to avoid injuries from defects in the highways or from defects in
the conveyance. Though the negligence of the driver
is not imputed to the passenger, still he must exercise
reasonable care under the circumstances despite the fact
that he may be intoxicated or is not driving the car ;36
34 Munson v. Rupker, (Ind. App.) 148 N. E. 169.
35 172 Ark. 862.
36 Engstrom v. Canadian Northern Ry. Co., 299 Fed. 929; Wicker

v. Scott, 29 Fed. (2d) 807; McDermott v. Sibert, 218 Ala. 670; Graves
v. Jewel Tea Co., 180 Ark. 980; Shields v. King, 207 Cal. 275; Benjamin
v. Noonan, 207 Cal. 279; Campion v. Eakle, 79 Colo. 320; Clarke v. Connecticut Co., 83 Conn. 219; Weidlich v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.,
93 Conn. 438; Poynter v. Townsend, 33 Del. 51; Fredericks v. Chicago
Rys. Co., 208 Ill. App. 172; Pence v. Hines, 221 Ill. App. 584; Grifenhan v. Chicago Rys. Co., 299 Ill. 590; Wolf v. Vehling, 79 Ind. App. 221;
Johnson v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co., 194 Iowa 1230; In re
Hill's Estate, 202 Iowa 1038; Clark v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 115 Kan.
823; Nevitt v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 115 Kan. 439; Winston's
Adm'r v. City of Henderson, 179 Ky. 220; Rice's Adm'rs v. Kentucky
Traction & Terminal Co., 209 Ky. 538; Jacobs v. Jacobs, 141 La. 272;
Humphrey v. Hoppe, 128 Me. 92; County Com'rs v. Wright, 138 Md.
577; Fogg v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 223 Mass. 444; June v.
Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co., 232 Mich. 449; Praught v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 144 Minn. 309; Carnegie v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 128
Minn. 14; Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v. Brown, 138 Miss. 39; Nahorski v. St.
Louis Electric Terminal Ry. Co., 310 Mo. 227; Cody v. Wells, (Mo.
App.) 280 S. W. 83; Lewis v. Kansas City Public Service Co., (Mo.
App.) 17 S. W. (2d) 359; Schroeder v. Public Service Ry. Co., (N. J.)
118 Atl. 337; Pouch v. Staten Island Midland Ry. Co., 126 N. Y. Supp.
738; Terwilliger v. Long Island R. Co., 136 N. Y. Supp. 733, affirmed
209 N. Y. 522; Toledo Rys. & Light Co. v. Mayers, 93 Ohio St. 304;
Thrasher v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 86 Okl. 88; Johnson v. Underwood, 102 Or. 680; Murray v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 281 Pa. 474;
Morningstar v. Northeast Pennsylvania R. Co., 290 Pa. 14; Latimer
v. Anderson County, 95 S. C. 187; Hurt v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 140
Tenn. 623; Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Wentzel, (Tex. Civ. App.)
214 S. W. 710; Lawrence v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 52 Utah 414; Wentworth v. Town of Waterbury, 90 Vt. 60; Director General of Railroads
v. Lucas, 130 Va. 212; Kloppfenstein v. Eads, 143 Wash. 104; Clise v.
Prunty, 108 W. Va. 635; Glick v. Baer, 186 Wis. 268; Graham's Adm'r
v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 185 Ky. 370; Knight v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry. Co., 111 Kan. 308; Schwartz v. Johnson, 152 Tenn. 586.

RIGHTS OF GRATUITOUS

PASSENGERS

and the rule is more strict concerning accidents at rail-

road crossings. Thus, in Carnegie v; Great Northern
Railway Company,37 the court says:
The negligence of a driver of a vehicle is not imputed to a
mere passenger riding therein. Nevertheless, a passenger is
required to exercise a proper degree of care for his own safety,
and any negligence on his part that contributes to his injury
is fatal to his right of recovery. He is obliged to exercise
such care as a reasonably prudent person would, when riding
with another under similar circumstances. A person of ordinary prudence riding with another upon his invitation will
naturally put a certain trust in his judgment, and will rely
in some measure on the assumption that he will use care to
avoid the ordinary dangers of the road. In order conclusively
to charge a mere passenger with contributory negligence in
failing to see the approaching train, something more than
ability to see and a failure to look must be shown. His failure
to look is evidence to be considered on the question of his
negligence but it is not conclusive against him. In general,
the primary duty of caring for the safety of the vehicle and
its passengers rests upon the driver, and a mere gratuitous
passenger should not be found guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, unless he in some way actually
participates in the negligence of the driver, or is aware either
that the driver is incompetent or careless, or unmindful of
some danger known to or apparent to the passenger, or that
the driver is not taking proper precautions in approaching
a place of danger, and being so aware fails to warn or admonish the driver, or to take proper steps to preserve his own
safety.
The steps that the passenger must take in the exercise
of ordinary care will vary with the circumstances, and
in few cases, if in any, are they the same that the law
exacts of the driver.38
37 128 Minn. 14.
38 Higgins v. Metzger, 101 Vt. 285; Krause v. Hall, 195 Wis. 565;
Poynter v. Townsend, 33 Del. 51; Thomas v. Illinois Central R. Co.,
169 Iowa 337; Denton v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 97 Kan. 498;
Murray v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 281 Pa. 474; Clarke v. Connecticut
Co., 83 Conn. 219; Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Lucken, 137 Miss. 572.

CHICAGO-KENT

REVIEW

A guest riding in an automobile has a right to rely
upon the proper discharge of the driver's duty to him,
and he is not obliged to anticipate negligence on the part
of the driver. This reliance, however, is not absolute.
A guest riding on the front seat of an automobile is not
excused from all responsibility, but he may rely upon
the driver's watchfulness more or less according to circumstances, without forfeiting his right of recovery
against one by whose negligence he is injured.3 9
In the case of Terwiliger v. Long Island Railroad
Co.,40 an action was brought by the wife of a decedent
to recover damages for her husband's death as a result
of alleged negligence by the defendant in operating one
of its trains. At the time of the accident the plaintiff's
husband was a guest in an automobile owned and driven
by a Mr. Welsh. The defense was the contributory negligence of the plaintiff's intestate. In affirming judgment
for the plaintiff the court says:
He [plaintiff's intestate] was a passenger-a guest, in a car
operated by a friend, and while he could not close his eyes to
an obvious or well known danger, he was not called upon to

exercise any active diligence to guard against a danger which
was not known to him or which was not likely to befall one
situated as he was in the car. He had a right to assume that
Mr. Welsh, his friend, would exercise reasonable care in the
circumstances of the operation of his car; and unless he was
aware of the railroad crossing, and had reason to apprehend

that Mr. Welsh would run his car into a position of danger,
the jury might properly find that he was in the exercise of
that reasonable degree of care which an ordinarily prudent
39 Loughrey v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 284 Pa. 267; Leclair v. Boudreau,
101 Vt. 270; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Emens, 231 Fed. 636; Birmingham Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Barranco, 203 Ala. 639; Carpenter v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 51 Cal. App. 60; Poynter v. Townsend,
33 Del. 51; Bradley v. Interurban Ry. Co., 191 Iowa 1351; Hamilton
v. DeCamp, 120 Kan. 645; Avery v. Thompson, 117 Me. 120; Salisbury
v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 239 Mass. 430; Kokesh v. Price, 136 Minn.
304; Schlosstein v. Bernstein, 293 Pa. 245; Stem v. Nashville Interurban Ry., 142 Tenn. 494; Davis v. Pettitt, (Tex. Com. App.) 258
S. W. 1046.
40 136 N. Y. Supp. 733.
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person would exercise under like circumstances, by merely
sitting still and talking to a fellow passenger ....
Of course, if
the passenger was familiar with a known danger, if he was
better informed of the circumstances than the driver, it might
be his duty to watch and point out the danger, but here the
car was being driven on flat land, in broad daylight, and at an
angle with the track, which had been crossed some distance
back, and which was to be crossed again at grade.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, by a late decision, in the case of Hoen v. Haines,41 holds, in effect,
that the question of whether a guest, under the circumstances, had a right to assume the driver would operate
the car in an efficient manner should go to the jury along
with the other facts. In this case, the plaintiff was riding
as a guest in an automobile which was approaching a
bridge in the process of repair, as a result of which, part
of the road had been dosed, thus allowing traffic to proceed one way at a time. The defendant's car, in attempting to proceed against the one way traffic, collided with
the car in which the plaintiff was riding, thereby causing the latter injuries. The court charged the jury that
if the plaintiff had not kept a reasonable lookout ahead
she could not recover. A verdict was returned in favor
of the defendant and the plaintiff alleged exceptions to
this charge. The Supreme Court in granting a new trial
to the plaintiff, remarked:
The charge nowhere contains an explanation of what would
legally constitute a reasonable lookout ahead. . . . The
jury were not told that the precautions that the plaintiff was
bound to take for her own safety were much less than those demanded of the driver, and that she was not called upon to
utter any warning of approaching danger unless she knew,
or ought to have known that the driver was unaware of it.
Neither were they instructed that, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, the plaintiff was entitled to assume
that the driver would not enter the sphere of . . . peril
ahead or fail to be duly observant of approaching cars.
41 (N. H.) 154 AtI. 129.
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Thus, the New Hampshire Court agrees substantially
with that of New York.
In Stemler v. Cady,42 the defendant's car was zigzagging and on the left side of road. On seeing this,
the driver of the truck in which plaintiff was riding as
guest turned to the left to avoid a collision; but defendant's car turned to the right at the same time, thus causing the accident. The court refused to instruct that if
plaintiff's driver was negligent and his negligence contributed to the accident, the plaintiff could not recover;
that if the plaintiff surrendered all care to the driver of
truck, she could not recover and was bound by his negligence. The Supreme Court, holding that there was no
error in refusing to give such instruction, says:
It could be found from the evidence that the plaintiff was
looking ahead, saw the defendant's automobile approaching
on the wrong side of the road, and the collision occurred so
suddenly that she had no time or opportunity to escape. So
far as the operation of the machine was concerned she necessarily relied largely upon the experienced driver of the car.
And she had no reason to anticipate the sudden change of di-

rection taken by one or both automobiles which resulted in the
collision.
43
The case of Churchill v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co.
is somewhat analogous to Stemler v. Cady, in that the
plaintiffs in both cases were forced to act quickly in an
unforeseen, dangerous position. Here the plaintiff sued
for the death of his father who was riding on the front
seat of a car owned and driven by one Hayslip. In affirming judgment for the plaintiff the following portions of
the opinion become of interest:

Granting that driver was negligent in approaching crossing
without slackening his speed and attempting to beat the train
across it would not defeat the plaintiff's right to recover for
the death of his father unless the circumstances were such

that the deceased could be charged with negligence of his
42
43

246 Mass. 384.
151 La. 726.
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own. Plaintiff's intestate, not having charge of the operation
of the machine, was not required to keep a lookout for danger,
but could rely upon a discharge of this duty by the driver
who was responsible for its operation; and it not appearing
that the deceased saw the approaching train until almost the
instant of the collision, and, having shouted the warning as
soon as it was discovered, we do not find that he was guilty
of negligence.
It is believed, however, that this case is not altogether
sound and that the Louisiana Supreme Court renounced
the principle of this case in Williams v. Lenfan.t, 44 where
the following is stated:
Under the doctrine of many cases to which we have referred,

Williams [the guest] was not justified in remaining silent and
relying upon his assumption that the driver saw the other

car and appreciated the danger. The failure of Williams to
exercise the slightest care prevents his recovery.
As the cases hold that a guest to some extent may rely
upon the ability and experience of the driver in the immediate operation of the car, so they also bold that the
guest cannot relinquish all care, or relieve himself from
the exercise of all precaution for his own safety. One
of the leading decisions on this subject, that of the
Alabama Supreme Court in McDermott v. Sibert,4 5
rendered in 1928, has undoubtedly provoked severe criticism from those parties who are prone to sleep while
traveling over the highways at night. Here the plaintiff,
suing by next friend, was riding in defendant's car with
another friend. The defendant had been on this road
more than once and was familiar with the car and its
operation. The road was paved, straight, and level for
quite a distance and the lights on the car were burning
-brightly. In passing a car ahead of them, they ran into
a large loose rock, which caused the car to swerve to the
left. In attempting to turn it back into the paved road,
the front axle struck another rock, hidden from view by
44
45

15 La. App. 515.
218 Ala. 670.
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weeds, which upset the roadster. The plaintiff was asleep
and knew nothing of the accident until he regained consciousness. The plaintiff's suit rests upon alleged negligent operation of the car to which defendant pleaded
the general issue and contributory negligence on the
plaintiff's part. These two issues, submitted to the jury,
resulted in a verdict for the defendant, and from judgment the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment for defendant, saying in part:
It is the generally recognized rule that a person riding in an
automobile driven by another, even though not chargeable
with the driver's negligence, is not absolved from all personal care for his own safety but is under the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care to avoid injury; that is,
such care as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise
.
The authorities are also
under like circumstances. . .
to the effect that a passenger cannot negligently abandon the
exercise of his own faculties and trust entirely and absolutely
to the care and vigilance of the driver and then escape the
exercise of due care when the occasion arises. Moreover, the
plaintiff in the instant case, sitting on the extreme right with
the top fastened down, abandoned himself to sound sleep,
though so exposed to danger from being thrown from the car,
and in such relaxed condition, the jury may find, had prevented
any effort on his part to exercise care for his own safety, and
the more serious injury to the plaintiff as compared to the
lesser injuries to his companions, tends to illustrate the peril
of such exposure.
The case was one peculiarly within the province of the jury,
and we find no occasion to disturb the action of the Court in
denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
Pryor,46
Similar decisions are to bel found in Burton v.
48
47
Dedman v. Dedman, and Leclair v. Boudreau.

This rule does not place an absolute liability upon the
guest if he fails to maintain a continual lookout, but it
46 (Mo. App.) 198 S. W. 1117.
47 155 Tenn. 241.
48 101 Vt. 270.
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does not relieve him from all responsibility to exercise
care for his own safety more or less according to the situations involved in each particular case. One's responsibility as a guest in the rear seat of an automobile or49
other vehicle is less than as a guest in the front seat,
regarding which the Supreme Court of Connecticut has
said:
The guest on the rear seat of the automobile owes a very limited
degree of care. He is not expected to direct the driver nor
to keep a lookout. Dangers or threatened dangers known to
him he must warn the driver of, and for his failure to do so
be chargeable with having proximately contributed to the
accident, unless a reasonable person under all the circumstances would not have given the warning. 50
While the law requires a guest in an automobile to
exercise ordinary care and prudence for his own safety,
and does not permit him to entrust his safety absolutely
to the driver, regardless of impending danger or apparent lack of ordinary caution on the part of the driver,
it does not require him to use the same vigilance as is
required of the driver, nor does it put him under the same
obligations as the driver in looking for dangers. Whether
he is contributorily negligent for not maintaining a lookout varies with the facts. The Connecticut Supreme
Court in the leading case of Clarke v. Connecticut
Company,51 says:
A gratuitous passenger in no matter what vehicle is not expected, ordinarily, to give advice or direction as to its control
and management. To do so might be harmful rather than
helpful. But his presence in the vehicle may so obstruct the
driver's view of a car or other approaching vehicle, or other
49 Marion & Bluffton Traction Co. v. Umphress, 73 Ind. App. 703;
Glanville v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 190 Iowa, 174; June v. Grand
Trunk Western Ry. Co., 232 Mich. 449; Beall v. Kansas City Rys. Co.,
(Mo. App.) 228 S. W. 834; Tennessee Cent. R. Co. v. Vanhoy, 143
Tenn. 312; Schlosstein v. Bernstein, 293 Pa. 245.
50 Weldlich v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 93 Conn. 438.
51 83 Conn. 219.
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circumstances of the situation may be such as to make it his
duty to look out for threatened or possible dangers and to warn
the driver of such after their discovery. This might be necessary
for the passenger's as well as the driver's safety. On the other
hand the character of the vehicle in which he is a passenger
may be such or his location in it may be such that to look or
listen for approaching cars or other dangers would be unnecessary and useless. For such a passenger to engage in conversation with fellow passengers and entirely neglect to look out
for dangers or to observe the manner in which the vehicle
is being operated might be the conduct of a reasonably
prudent person. It cannot be said, therefore, that in every
case and all the time it is the duty of a gratuitous passenger
to use his senses or to look and listen in order to discover
approaching vehicles or other dangers, or that his failure to
do so would be a failure to exercise due care. But while this
is so, the law fixes no different standard of duty for him than
for the driver. Each is bound to use reasonable care. What
conduct on the passenger's part is necessary to comply with
this duty must, depend upon all the circumstances, one of
which is that he is merely a passenger having no control over the
management of the vehicle in which he is being transported.
Manifestly the conduct which reasonable care requires of such
a passenger will not ordinarily, if in any case, be the same
as that which it would require of the driver. While the
standard of duties is the same the conduct required to fulfill
that duty is different because their circumsta nces are different.
Whether reasonable care has been exercised in either case is
a question of fact for the jury.
In the case of Toney v. Herman Hale flumber Company52 the jury returned a verdict for the defendant and
found that while the driver had used ordinary care the
plaintiff, a guest in the driver's car, was guilty of contributory negligence. The Supreme Court refused to disturb the verdict, since the jury had found that failure
of the plaintiff to keep a lookout was contributory negligence which was the proximate cause of the injury. A
52

(Texas) 36 S. W. (2d) 234.
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case in which a similar decision was rendered is that of
53
Schweig v. Wells.
The case of Siinrell v. Eschenbach54 is an action by
the plaintiffs, husband and wife, to recover for injuries
sustained due to negligence of the defendants. Although
the husband, who was driving, was also negligent since
the lights on his car did not meet the statutory requirements, the lower court rendered judgments for
both plaintiffs. The defendant appealed on the grounds
of plaintiffs' contributory negligence. The judgment for
the wife was affirmed but reversed as to husband because
of his contributory negligence. The court says:
While the husband's negligence would not defeat the wife's
action, yet her own negligence would. As an occupant of the
car she was bound to exercise reasonable care for her own
safety, but the record discloses nothing as a matter of law
which proves the contrary. So far as appears, the doctor [husband] was in general a careful driver, and she did not know that
the defendant's truck or any other obstruction or danger lurked
by the way. Hence there was no reason why she should be
alert. . . . A passenger is only required to act in the presence of some threatened danger. As she took no part in the
driving and knew of no danger, the fact that she was dozing
when the crash came did not necessarily convict her of negligence.
It must be noted that the holding in this case is directly
contra to the decision reached in McDermott v. Siebert,
previously discussed, in which the facts were similar.
Since the case of Goehmann v. National Biscuit Company, 55 decided in April, 1931, has elicited editorial comment from several Chicago newspapers, it also warrants
our consideration. Here, the plaintiffs were riding as
guests in an automobile on a Wisconsin state highway.
At the intersection of this and another state road the
car in which the plaintiffs were riding was struck by one
of the defendant's trucks. At the intersection the car
(Mo.) 26 S. W. (2d) 851.
303 Pa. 156.
55 (Wis.) 235 N. W. 792.
53
54
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had stopped, and both driver and the occupants had
looked down the highway. Perceiving the defendant's
truck, they estimated its distance away as 150 feet, which
would have given their car ample time to cross. They
were mistaken in their estimate of the truck's distance
away and a collision occurred. In the lower court, judgment was given for the defendant, based substantially
on the ground that the plaintiffs should have protested
to the driver of their car in some manner. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding as follows:
The plaintiffs were not negligent in failing to warn Immel [the

driver] of the approaching car because he was aware of its approach. They are not negligent in failing to protest against
an effort to cross ahead of the truck, because the court says
that could easily have been done if he [the driver] had speeded
up his car to fifteen miles per hour, which is apparent from
the physical facts. The negligence of Immel consisted in
the manner in which he managed his car for the moment.
We do not consider that the law casts upon the occupants
of a car any duty with reference to the manner in which it
is momentarily managed by the driver. Not only does it
not cast any duty upon them in such respect, but it should
not recognize any prerogatives on their part. Driving from
the back seat should not be encouraged when it comes to the
details of car management in emergencies. The practice is
not indulged in by considerate persons, and, if it were, the
harm would exceed the good. The momentary management
of the car should be left to the driver. . . . Continual
suggestions are but confusing and irritating and we think
it better that it be definitely understood that neither duty
devolves upon, nor prerogatives belong to, the occupants of
a car to participate in the immediate management and control. They have a duty to maintain a lookout, a duty to
warn, and a duty to protest against excessive speed and reckless driving. These however, are all apart from the immediate
management of the car, especially in emergencies.
An analysis of the foregoing decision reveals that it
contains no unorthodox principles of any nature. The
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court seemingly goes out of its way to condemn, in no
uncertain terms, "back-seat driving," and yet reaches
the final conclusion that a guest must maintain a lookout,
must warn, and must protest.
We have previously commented upon the fact that the
rule is stricter at railroad crossings, the reason being
that here is an exceedingly dangerous place and one
which should be approached with the utmost care and
caution, for if one is struck violently, death usually ensues immediately. The automobile has the better opportunity to avoid a possible accident; and, with a certain
amount of precaution, safety may be insured.
In Bradley v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company5 6 the
court held that plaintiff's intestate riding in an automobile with another, who was driving, when struck and
killed at a railroad crossing with which he was familiar,
was under the same duty as the driver to look and listen
for approaching trains, and while the negligence of the
driver was not imputable to him he himself was chargeable with contributory negligence, when, by looking, he
could have seen the train in time to have avoided the
accident. This decision is in line with all Federal holdings for they are among the jurisdictions which hold that
one who fails to look and listen for approaching trains
is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
and especially is this true of one riding on the front seat
with the same view as that of the driver. 57 Cases of
particular importance are Brommer v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Company58 and Stephenson's Administratrix v.
Sharp's Executors."
56 288 Fed. 484.
57 Southern Ry. Co. v. Priester, 289 Fed. 945; Parramore v. Denver
& R. G. W. R. Co., 5 Fed. (2d) 912; Opp v. Pryor, 294 I1. 538; Ohio
Electric Co. v. Evans, 77 Ind. App. 669; Beemer v. Chicago, R. I. &
P. Ry. Co., 181 Iowa 642; Ewing v. Union Pac. R. Co., 117 Kan. 200;
Leopold v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 144 La. 1000; Pigeon v. Massachusetts
Northern St. Ry. Co., 230 Mass. 39?; Loughrey v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
284 Pa. 267; Texas City Terminal Co. v. Showalter, (Tex. Civ. App.)
257 S. W. 621; Le Febvre v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 97 Vt. 342;
Sadler v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 118 Wash. 121; Jameson v. Norfolk
& W. Ry. Co., 97 W. Va. 119.
58 179 Fed. 577.
59 222 Ky. 496.
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Where a passenger attempts to advise the driver that
he may proceed in safety or assumes the duty of looking
out for dangers, he may not recover if an dccident occurs
because of his failure to do such. Decisions regarding
such cases are given in Smellie v. Southern Pacific Comnpany60 and Morningstarv. Northeast PennsylvaniaRailroad Company."'
A person, riding as a guest, who assumes a dangerous
position, such as sitting on the floor of the truck with
feet hanging over the side or with feet on the running
board, cannot recover for injuries sustained while riding
thus. 2 In a Missouri case the court said:
The law is well settled that, where a person voluntarily assumes a position of imminent peril and danger where there is
at hand and accessible to him a place of safety, and by reason of haven taken the dangerous position he is injured, he
cannot recover against another, who is also negligent, because such person's negligence in taking the dangerous position is one of the direct and proximate causes of the injuries
63
and contributes thereto.
If a passenger sees that a driver is guilty of negligence in the operation of the machine or is oblivious of
some danger apparent to the passenger, he must, in the
exercise of reasonable care, give some warning to the
driver in an effort to avoid the imminent peril.0 4 This
60 (Cal.) 276 Pac. 338.
01 290 Pa. 14.
62 Crider v. Yolande Coal & Coke Co., 206 Ala. 71; Worden v. Anthony, 101 Conn. 579.
63 Smith v. Ozark Water Mills Co., 215 Mo. App. 129.
64 Brommer v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 179 Fed. 577; Weidlich v. New
York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 93 Conn. 438; Dale v. Jaeger, 44 Ida. 576;
Ohio Electric Co. v. Evans, 77 Ind. App. 669; Ferguson v. Lang, 126
Kan. 273; Chambers v. Hawkins, 233 Ky. 211; Jacobs v. Jacobs, 141
La. 272; Carnegie v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 128 Minn. 14; Irwin v.
McDougal, 217 Mo. App. 645; Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Lucken, 137
Miss. 572; Baus v. Trenton & Mercer County Traction Corp., 102 N.
J. L. 1; Terwilliger v. Long Island R. Co., 136 N. Y. Supp. 733,
affirmed 209 N. Y. 522; Rogers v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co.,
66 Or. 244; Eline v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 262 Pa. 33; Dedman
v. Dedman, 155 Tenn. 241; Brothers v. North Coast Power Co., 127
Wash. 570; Clise v. Prunty, 108 W. Va. 635; Wappler v. Schenck, 178
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point of view is expressed in the case of Schlosstein v.

Bernstein.6 5
The Alabama Supreme Court, in the case of Birmingham
6
Railway Light and Power Company v. Barranco,
held:
There is no duty on such guest to anticipate that the independent driver of the vehicle in which such guest is riding
will enter the sphere of danger or peril ahead, or will omit
to exercise commensurate care to sense the approach or probable approach of other agencies of transportation with reference to which the ordinarily prudent driver should in due
observance of his duty govern the movement of the vehicle
he controls. Where, however, such guest knows of the danger
or peril into which or toward which the vehicle is being
driven, or the circumstances of the realized speed of the
vehicle and known location and its surroundings ahead are
such as to suggest, to a reasonably prudent person likewise
situated, the probability that a sphere of danger or peril
may be created thereby, or may be entered in the course of
the vehicle's movement, it is the duty of such guest to warn
the driver in the premises and to protest [against] a continuance of a movement so actually or probably fraught with
danger or peril to such occupant of the vehicle. In other
words, the duty imposed upon such person, whatever his seat
in the vehicle, is created by either known dangers or perils
that the attendant circumstances reasonably suggest or foreshadow. The duty is therefore not original with respect to
the operation of the vehicle, but resultant, and that only from
known and appreciated circumstances capable of bringing it
into effect. Otherwise the law would be held to sanction
this irrational result: such person would be allowed to close
his senses to known dangers or to perils reasonably suggested
by the attendant circumstances indicated, in blind reliance
upon the unaided care of another independent of such perWis. 632; Dover v. Archhambault, 57 Cal. App. 659; Grifenhan v. Chicago Rys. Co., 299 Ill. 590; Pence v. Hines, 221 Ill. App. 584; Greenstreet v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 234 Ill. App. 339; Williams v. Lenfant, 15 La. App. 515; Dee v. City of Peru, 343 Il. 36.
65 293 Pa. 245.
66 203 Ala. 639.
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son's control though that other is without assuming the consequences of the omission of such ordinary care as the attendant circumstances or known perils create.
This decision, with its lucid reasoning, it is believed,
represents the weight of authority. A recent utterance
of the Illinois Supreme Court presents practically the
same reasoning.67
It thus seems well settled that the guest must warn of
dangers in accordance with the situation; but "such suggestions should be reasonably made and should, of course,
not take the form of what is commonly known as 'back
seat driving,' and should not be more insistent or vociferous than is warranted by the occasion and by the certainty of the existence of danger." 6"
One who enters an automobile as a guest takes such
car in its existing condition except as to latent defects
only within the knowledge of the owner or driver.6 9 In
the case of Waters v. Markham,70 the plaintiff's intestate
was killed by the car's overturning when a tire blew out.
The tires had gone twelve thousand miles and the evidence indicated that they were defective. The court, in
considering the condition of the car, said:
An automobile host may be held liable for injuries to his guest,
caused by a defective condition of his automobile, if he knew
of such defect and realized, or should have realized, that it
involved an unreasonable risk to his guest; if the defect was
so concealed or hidden as not to be reasonably obvious or
patent to the guest; if the defect and risk involved were in
fact unknown to the guest; and, if the host failed to warn
the guest of the defective condition and the risk involved.
This rule seems to be eminently fair and just and fully to
state the grounds for which the liability of a host for injuries
to his guest resulting from a defective condition of an automobile, may properly be predicated.
67 Dee v. City of Peru, 343 Ill. 36.
68 Williams v. Lenfant, 15 La. App. 515.

69 Munson v. Rupker, (Ind. App.) 148 N. E. 169; Marple v. Haddad,
103 W. Va. 508; Sommerfield v. Flury, 198 Wis. 42; Poneitowcki v.
Harres, 200 Wis. 504; Laffey v. Mullen, (Mass.) 175 N. E. 736.
70 (Wis.) 235 N. W. 797.
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On the other hand, the courts are strong in holding
that a guest who accepts an invitation to ride when aware
of the car's defective condition from which injury results, is guilty of contributory negligence.7 1 There is
little confusion or conflict in the holdings on this subject.
The plaintiff cannot recover for injuries caused by defects of which he has knowledge, but he may recover
where there are latent defects of which the driver or
owner knows, but of which he fails to warn the guest.
One who enters a car as guest assumes the risk incident to the known incompetency, reckless habits, inexperience, and proficiency of the driver.72 In Sommerfield
v. Flury et al.,7 3 the Wisconsin court held:
The duty devolving upon the driver of a car is said to be not
to increase the danger or add a new one. Obviously the danger
which he is under obligation not to increase is the danger which
may be anticipated upon entering the car. One so entering
the car . . . assumes the dangers incident to the known
incompetency or inexperience of the driver. He also assumes
the dangers incident to the known habits of the driver. He is
also bound by his acquiescence in the speed maintained or other
respects in which the car is handled.
On the other hand, it has been held that the known
incompetency and inexperience of the driver are merely
facts to be considered in determining whether the guest
was guilty of contributory negligence.7 4
In Marks v. Dorkin,7 5 it was said:
There can be no contributory negligence or assumption of
risk arising on the part of an invited guest from the mere
knowledge that the driver on former occasions has so driven
71 Rebillard v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 216 Fed. 503;
Helming v. People's National Bank, 206 Iowa 206.
72 Sommerfield v. Flury, 198 Wis. 42; Kelly v. Gagnon, (Neb.) 236
N. W. 160; Poneitowcki v. Harres, 200 Wis. 504; Thomas v. Steppert,
200 Wis. 388.
73 198 Wis. 42.
74 Wiley v. Young, 178 Cal. 681; Kalamian v. Kalamian, (Conn.)
139 Atl. 635.
75 105 Conn. 521.
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his automobile as to indicate that he is likely to drive reckContributory negligence or assumption of risk
lesly. . .
in relation to the negligent driving of a car cannot arise until
it is disclosed to, or ought to have been known to, the guest
that the driver is driving negligently; in other words, a guest,
merely because he believes or fears from past experience that
the driver of a car may drive negligently, does not assume
the risk of any such negligence or fail to use due care by
accepting an inivitation to ride.

It is hardly thought that this case represents the best
view nor the weight of authority as found in the case of
Sommerfield v. Flury.

The fact that a guest rides with one under a physical
disability does not establish as a matter of law his contributory negligence, unless the guest knew that the
driver's disability would hinder his proper management
of the car and endanger the safety of himself and the
78
occupants.
If a guest rides in a car knowing that the driver is
intoxicated and injury results from the driver's failure
to manage and operate the car as a reasonably prudent
person because of such intoxication, the guest cannot
recover. This rule applies even though the driver has
77
become intoxicated after the commencement of the ride.
Of course, if the intoxication is not known to the guest
and there are no facts or conditions from which he might
know of it, the rule should not apply.7 8
76Krause v. Rarity, (Cal. App.) 283 Pac. 886 and 285 Pac. 879,
affirmed by the Supreme Court in 293 Pac. 62; Gaffney v. City of
Dixon, 157 Ill. App. 589.
77 McGeever v. O'Byrne, 203 Ala. 266; Lynn v. Goodwin, 170 Cal.
112; Fitzpatrick v. Cinitis, 107 Conn. 91; Besserman v. Hines, 219 Ill.
App. 606; Kirmse v. Chicago, T. H. & S. E. Ry. Co., 73 Ind. App. 537;
Winston's Adm'r v. City of Henderson, 179 Ky. 220; Livaudais v.
Black, 13 La. App. 345; Meenagh v. Buckmaster, 50 N. Y. Supp. 85;
Schwartz v. Johnson, 152 Tenn. 586; Shiflett's Adm'x v. Virginia Railway & Power Co., 136 Va. 72; Wayson v. Rainier Taxi Co., 136 Wash.
274; Cunningham v. Erie R. Co., 121 N. Y. Supp. 706; Jensen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 133 Wash. 208.
78 Fitzpatrick v. Cinitis, 107 Conn. 91; Pittsburg C., C. & St. L. Ry.
Co. v. Kephert, 61 Ind. App. 621.

RIGHTS

OF GRATUITOUS

PASSENGERS

In Winston's Administrator v. City of Henderson,79
a leading case both on speeding -and intoxication, plaintiff's intestate, Winston, was killed while a guest in an
automobile. Both Winston and the driver were intoxicated. In the defendant city, the car overturned in
striking a ditch which the plaintiff alleges was in a defective condition, known to the defendant. In holding that
there could be no recovery by the plaintiff, the court is
definite in denunciation of conduct such as appeared in
this case:
When two or more persons voluntarily drive or ride an automobile upon a public highway at a dangerously high rate of
speed merely for the purpose of enjoying the exhilerating
and pleasurable sensations incident to the swirl and dash of
rapid transit, they may properly be said to be engaged in joyriding. Such joyriders not only assume the risks of danger
attendant upon the sudden and violent movements of the car,
but also such as arise from the inability of the driver, when
traveling at a high rate of speed, to make short, quick stops to
avoid collisions, or defects in the street, or direct the car at
bends and curves in the road so as to keep in the traveled way.
One about to enter a car should exercise reasonable care
to see that the driver in charge is an experienced, reasonably
safe, and sober person, and if he fails to do this and injury
results to him from a defect in the street to which the negligence, want of skill, or care on the part of the driver contributed, such negligence is chargeable to him.
Even while prosecuting a journey, if the driver becomes
intoxicated so as to lose control of the vehicle, or is reckless, and
this is known to the passenger, ordinary care requires the
passenger to call upon the driver to stop and to allow him
to alight or turn the management of the vehicle over to
another capable of properly directing it, and if the passenger
fails to exercise such care and is injured as a result of the
negligence or recklessness of the driver and a third person,
he may not have recourse of such third person, this being denied
him because of his own negligence rather than upon the
ground that the negligence of the driver is imputed to him.
79

179 Ky. 220.
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This rule seems to be too well settled to warrant further citation or consideration. The authorities were aptly
summarized in Schwartz v. Johnson. 0
When a guest rides in an automobile and permits the
driver to run at a reckless or fast speed, or encourages
such speed, he may properly be charged with contributory negligence. 81 One of the most interesting as well
as one of the leading cases on this subject is that of
Dale v. Jaeger. 2 The court said in part:
Here was a car admittedly plunging through the night on
straight stretches at a rate of forty-seven to sixty miles per
hour, the curtains down, and the disturbed atmosphere assuredly rushing like an incipient tornado by the speeders'
With a lighted speedometer directly facing him,
ears. .
acquainted with cars both as passenger and driver, with the
car lights covering the road fifty or seventy-five feet ahead,
with the swish of gravel and roar of the air, can it be said
that any human being in possession of his five senses may be
heard to say that at this abandoned rate of speed he possessed
his soul in sweet oblivion and "didn't notice anything out of
the way, the way it was riding?" For the man in the street,
the reasonably prudent citizen whose legislative representatives have unequivocally banned such wanton driving on the
public highways, plaintiff's plea will fall on deaf ears. If
plaintiff did not know, he should have known, and in law he
is fixed with knowledge that was being flashed to him on
83
every side.
Even a protest may be insufficient, if it is not heeded

and the passenger takes no further steps for his safety;
80 152 Tenn. 586.
81 McGeever v. O'Byrne, 203 Ala. 266; Stewart v. San Joaquin Light

& Power Co., 44 Cal. App. 202; Tracy v. Welch, 109 Conn. 144; Ferry
v. City of Waukegan, 196 Ill. App. 81; Fair v. Union Traction Co., 102
Kan. 611; Hutchens v. Morgan, 12 La. App. 545; State v. Phillinger,
142 Md. 365; Jepson v. Crosstown St. Ry., 129 N. Y. Supp. 233; Dale
v. Jaeger, 44 Ida. 576; Harding v. Jesse, 189 Wis. 652; Langley v.
Southern Ry. Co., 113 S. C. 45; Wagenbauer v. Schwinn, 285 Pa. 128;
Perry v. Ryback, (Pa.) 153 Atl. 770; Curry v. Riggles, (Pa.) 153 Atl.
325; Chambers v. Hawkins, 233 Ky. 211.
82 44 Ida. 576.
83 See also State v, Phllinger, 142 Md. 365.
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as was stated in Sheehan v. Coffey.8 4 Then again, the
law fixes no specified rate of speed at which the guest
must protest against such excessive speed as to be held
guilty of contributory negligence.8 5 Furthermore, the
reckless driving must have continued long enough to have
afforded the guest a reasonable opportunity to protest
against it; 6 and, where the guest makes a reasonable
protest against the speed but an accident occurs before
he has an opportunity to take further steps for his safety,
he is not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law."7 Such a situation, however, presents a question
for the jury to determine-that is, whether his actions
were those of an ordinarily prudent person under the
circumstances. 8 The amount or sufficiency of the protest
must also be determined by the jury in view of the actions
of reasonable persons, as stated in Krause v. Hall:8 9
No case has been found, however, which attempts to define
the amount of protestation necessary to relieve the guest of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. When it is considered that the guest has no control over the automobile and
that it is not within his power to coerce the driver, it is apparent that all the guest may do is to indicate to the host
his or her displeasure with reference to the manner in which
the car is being driven.
As has been noted, the liability of the guest is predicated upon the knowledge that the car is being driven
at an excessive speed. It then follows that a guest who
is ignorant of the speed of the automobile cannot be held
to the same responsibility as one having full knowledge
of such facts 0
84

200 N. Y. Supp. 55.

Vt. 285.
Gordon v. Opalecky, 152 Md. 536.

85 Higgins v. Metzger, 101
86

87 Rappaport v. Roberts, (Mo. App.) 203 S. W. 676; Masten v. Cousins, 216 Ill. App. 268.
88 Curran v. Earle C. Anthony, Inc., 77 Cal. App. 462; Dedman v.
Dedman, 155 Tenn. 241.
8s 195 Wis. 565.
90 Bolton v. Wells, 58 N. D. 286; Higgins v. Metzger, 101 Vt. 285.
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Where the occupant who is aware of such facts as the
excessive speed and reckless driving does not leave the
machine when an adequate opportunity arises, but unreasonably remains in the machine, or at least does not
insist upon leaving, he may be chargeable with negligenceY 1 Obviously, a failure to leave cannot be construed
as negligence in all circumstances. It might be gross
folly in some instances to attempt to leave; and, in
others, it might be highly proper. At any event, the
occupant's failure to leave is a question
of fact depend2
ing upon the variable circumstances.
Occasions will arise where the passenger's best recourse under the circumstances would have been to jump,
thus avoiding the impending accident, but his failure to
follow the best recourse is not contributory negligence
as a matter of law, for while acting in such an emergency the law does not hold him to the same care as a
person acting under ordinary circumstances. 9 3 On the
other hand, suppose he observes the car approaching an
impending peril or danger, and in an effort to avoid it,
leaves the vehicle and thus injures himself. Although it
may be proved subsequently that if he had remained with
the machine such injury would not have occurred, he is
not guilty of contributory negligence in choosing the
94
wrong alternative in such an emergency.
After an analysis of the foregoing cases is it possible
to arrive at a sane conclusion as to the rights and liabilities of gratuitous automobile passengers?
It is the incontrovertible general rule that such passengers must at all times exercise ordinary care--the
care which people in general, of ordinarily prudent
91 Sheehan v. Coffey, 200 N. Y. Supp. 55; Krouse v. Southern Michigan Ry. Co., 215 Mich. 139; Garrow v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 135 Wash.
630; Kloppfenstein v. Eads, 143 Wash. 104; Clark v. Traver, 200 N. Y.
Supp. 52, affirmed in 237 N. Y. 544.
92 Shields v. King, 207 Cal. 275; Curran v. Earle C. Anthony, Inc.,
77 Cal. App. 462.
93 Ellis v. Central California Traction Co., 37 Cal. App. 390; Kolanko
v. Erie R. Co., 212 N. Y. Supp. 714.
94 Parker v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 181 N. C. 95.
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habits-would exercise under like circumstances and conditions. Whether his conduct is commensurate with this
standard of care is, in a majority of cases, a question of
fact for the jury.
The test of a passenger's negligence is his action or
want of action in the face of manifest danger, danger
known to him, or danger which it was his duty, as well
as the driver's, to observe. When dangers which are
either reasonably manifest or known to a passenger confront the driver of a vehicle, and the passenger has an
adequate and proper opportunity to control or influence
the situation for safety but sits by without warning or
protest and permits himself to be carelessly driven to
his injury, this is negligence which will bar his recovery.
This duty is applied more strictly at inherently dangerous places such as railway crossings. The passenger is
not obliged, even when the danger of an accident suddenly becomes imminent, to displace the driver or seize
the operating levers, for to do so would be more harmful than helpful. Warnings, so obnoxious to the majority
of drivers, should be reasonably made and in accordance
with the attendant circumstances and certainty of danger. In such cases, the vigilance required of a passenger
on the rear seat is less than that required of a passenger
on the front seat.
To a certain degree, the passenger may rely upon the
driver's ability to manage properly the car in a safe manner. The law, however, will not allow a blind reliance
upon the driver when approaching a place of danger or
when the circumstances would indicate a dangerous predicament, for he must exercise ordinary care, and look
out for himself in such situations.
A passenger who places himself in a dangerous position in the car although a safe place is accessible or
assumes to advise the driver of manifest dangers, but
fails to so do, is guilty of contributory negligence, thus
barring a recovery for injuries received where his negligence concurred in making the accident possible.
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A passenger who knows that the driver is under the
influence of liquor or should, in the exercise of reasonable
care, know it-either at the commencement of, or during,
the ride-is guilty of contributory negligence if he fails
to take measures to protect himself. If he knows the
driver is intoxicated before he enters the car, he is presumed to have acquiesced in the driver's subsequent
reckless conduct, occasioned by such intoxication.
A guest accepts the existing conditions of the car in
which he rides. If he knows of any defects therein, or
should have known of them, and injury results therefrom,
he may not recover. Latent defects must be disclosed
to the passenger in order to bar recovery.
A passenger who knows the driver is operating the
automobile in an unsafe manner or driving at an excessively dangerous speed must protest against such driving.
In failing to do so, he will be held to have acquiesced
and to have taken the risk of the danger which befell
him. Whether the number or manner of protests are
sufficient must vary with each case. Where the protests
are unavailing, he must quit the car if that may be done
with safety or at least order it to be stopped that he
may alight.
If it were possible to acquaint passenger, owner, and
operator with the doctrines which we have set forth, the
automobile accidents in this country would be materially
diminished. The law has certainly contributed to the
rational enjoyment of the automobile without making
any fast, arbitrary, or unbending rules. In treating the
rights and liabilities of gratuitous automobile passengers,
the law has kept pace with, and adapted itself to, the
rapidly changing conditions.

